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Abstract 
 
Few nations have changed as fast—or as Dramatically—as China has since the 1970s. The 
world’s most populous nation has radically liberalized its economy and gone from producing low-
quality and simple export to sophisticated high- technology goods, while nurturing a vibrant 
private sector and attracting nearly $500 billion in foreign direct investment (FDI). China’s total 
exports grew eightfold—to over $380 billion—between 1990 and 2003. China’s share of global 
exports will reach 6 percent in 2003, compared to 3.9 percent in 2000. The U.S. has lost about 2.6 
million manufacturing jobs since 2001. While private economists say that most of he job losses 
reflected improved productivity at U.S. factories, many in Congress and within industry say China 
blame China. China’s soaring economy has turned it into manufacturing juggernaut that 
maintains the largest trade surplus of many nations, including the U.S. U.S. law provides for the 
protection of American manufacturers form unfair foreign trade practices. If U.S. companies 
believe that foreign competitors are dumping merchandise in the U.S. or are being subsidized by 
foreign governments, they may file for relief with the U.S. Department of Commerce’s 
International Trade Administration and the U.S. Trade Commission.  Antidumping levies duties on 
goods dumped on the U.S. market. One of the most contested issues is whether U.S. trade laws, in 
particular the antidumping laws, should be open to negotiation. It should for the benefits of U.S. 
customers and U.S. businesses.  This research will focus on dumping charges against China and 
evaluate pros and cons of U.S. antidumping laws against foreign companies and its impact on 
U.S. consumers and businesses. 
 
 
1.  Introduction 
 
umping occurs when firms export merchandise at prices below the prices prevailing in their home 
market, which is sometimes, called “price-to-price dumping. ” When they export for a sustained 
period at prices which are below their average cost of production, and producers in the importing 
country are materially injured as a result. Dumping is widely recognized internationally as a potentially harmful and 
unfair trade practice. Virtually all-major trading nations have antidumping laws, including the U.S., the European 
Union and Japan. During the last two decades, there have been significant developments in the use of antidumping 
actions, the most popular protectionist policy in use today.  First, there has been an explosion in the total number of 
anti-dumping investigation filed. While the average annual number of antidumping initiations was 144 during 1980-
1985, it reached 318 in 2000-2001.  Secondly, while it was sued almost exclusively by the U.S. and EU, Canada and 
Australia until 1985 and it started to spread to other countries in 1990s. The U.S. uses antidumping legislation to 
address unfair trade practices by importing companies. Advocates of antidumping laws claim that they are essential 
in the fight against predatory pricing by foreign companies. Those opposing antidumping legislation suggest that it 
is just another form of protectionism that nurtures inefficient industries and increases cost to U.S. consumers. Critics 
D 
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also say that antidumping laws create impediments to free trade, which results in misallocation of global resources 
and the disregard of comparative advantages.  This paper examines antidumping charges against China and also 
evaluates the pros and cons to improve trade, economic, and the political environment between U.S., China, and 
other trading partners. 
 
2.  Antidumping Filing Procedures 
 
 Requirements for filing an antidumping or countervailing duty investigations are carried out by the 
Department of Commerce’s International Trade Administration (ITA) and by the U.S. International Trade 
Commission (ITC).  The ITA determines the existence of sales at less than fair value or subsidy programs, and the 
ITC determines whether a U.S. industry is being or may be materially injured. Although the ITA has the authority to 
initiate its own investigations, an interested party usually starts an investigation by sending petitions simultaneously 
to the ITA and the ITC. In filing petitions, interested parties must include the following data: information about the 
petitioner, descriptions of goods and exporters, evidence of dumping or subsidization, and evidence of material 
injury. The U.S. antidumping system provides tremendous protections for the benefit of foreign exporters subject to 
antidumping investigations.  They have full notice of the investigation, opportunities to review evidence and to be 
represented by counsel, and full rights to appeal administrative decisions for court review. Nor does the mere threat 
of an U.S. antidumping or countervailing duty actin impede competition. 
 
3.  Purposes of Antidumping and Countervailing Duty Legislation 
 
 Through its antidumping legislation, which levies duties on goods “dumped” on the U.S. market, the U.S. 
discourages the sale of merchandise in the U.S. at less than fair value if such sales cause or threaten material injury 
to a U.S. industry. By imposing similar duties, countervailing duty legislation checks the unfair competitive 
advantage foreign manufacturers and exporters receive from subsidies.  In some instances, countervailing duties can 
be imposed without application of a material injury test. 
 
4.  Dumping vs. Antidumping 
 
 Dumping means selling imports in U.S. at prices lower than their normal value. The difference between 
normal value and exports price is termed the “dumping margin.” Antidumping refers to a legal system under which 
the government of a country investigates the dumping of imports and take antidumping measures in accordance with 
the law. It is a measure internationally adopted to stop unfair competition, regulate international market order and 
protect the security of the national industries. 
 
5.  Non-Market Economy Status of China 
 
 In April 1998, the European Council with Council Regulation (EC) no. 905/98 gave individual Chinese and 
Russian companies the opportunity to claim that they operate in market economy conditions on a case-by-case basis.  
This regulation does not grant China the status of full market economy. However, provided that Chinese companies 
satisfy the requirements and dumping calculations are based on their own domestic price and costs and not those of a 
third country. When non-market economies are involved, Chinese antidumping regulations follow different 
procedures then one follows by the U.S.  When dealing with a non-market economy the price of the subject product 
in a comparable market economy must be used.  This has affected trading with China immensely since the U.S. 
considers China a non-market economy. Chinese antidumping regulations do not have this provision.  Chinese 
authorities use the company’s price whether in a market economy or not. 
 
6.  Determination Fair Value 
 
 To determine whether a product is being sold in the U.S. market at less than fair value, comparisons are 
made between U.S. prices of imported merchandise and, usually, home market prices (i.e., foreign manufacturer’s 
domestic prices) of the goods in question.  A home-market price can be expressed as an individual price or as a 
weighed average of the prices in the exporter’s domestic market for a specific time period. 
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7.  Establishing Material Injury 
 
 Whether material injury results from subsidized or dumped merchandise depends upon an analysis of the 
effects that U.S. imports have on U.S. producers of like products. Injuries may take the form of depressed prices; 
lost sales; a general decline in sales, market share, profit, and the volume of dumped imports. 
 
8.  Types of Dumping 
 
a. Price-to-price dumping: Price-to-price dumping can occur because the dumping industry enjoys some 
degree or market power in its domestic market which enables it to maintain a higher price in the home 
market than in export markets. This may arise out of protection of the home market from import 
competition (through restrictions on market entry, natural, or manmade factors); the relative absence of 
internal competition because of the existence of a monopolistic, oligopolistic or categorized market 
structure; or some combination of these factors. Absent such elements, the domestic price and the world 
price will equalize. 
b. Below cost dumping: Below-cost dumping can occur because the industry which is dumping possesses a 
structural characteristic which enables it to export its products below the cost of production for a sustained 
period without going out of business.  Such characteristics vary widely, but may include the existence of 
some form of government support, the ability to cross-subsidize losses in one product area with profits 
earned in other areas, or simply enormous which make it possible at a loss for a long period time. 
c. Predatory Dumping: A foreign manufacturer may take this actin because it wishes to sell excess production 
without disrupting prices in its domestic market, or it may have lowered the export price to force all 
domestic producers in the importing nation out of business. The exporters expect to raise prices in the 
market one that objective is accomplished. 
d. Social Dumping: Unfair competition by firms in developing nations that have lower labor cost and poor 
working conditions. 
e. Environmental Dumping; Unfair competition caused by a country’s lax environmental standards. 
f. Financial Service Dumping: Unfair competition caused by a nation allows requirements for bank 
capital/asset rations. 
g. Cultural Dumping: Unfair competition caused by cultural barriers aiding local firms. 
 
Most governments retaliate when dumping injuries local industry. The EU, for example, levied 
antidumping duties of 39.2 percent on handbags from China in spite of warning from European retailers and 
importers that such a move would cost more jobs than it would create. In fact, antidumping suits have become the 
favorite means of manufacturers in the EU, the U.S. and increasingly, other nations to protect themselves from less 
expensive imports. 
 
9.  Antidumping Charges Against China 
 
 In recent years, the number of dumping cases against China has skyrocketed. From August 1979 to March 
2001, a total of 422 antidumping cases had been filed against China involving more than US $10 billion worth of 
Chinese exports. The European Union (EU) leads the attack, followed closely by the US. Since 1991 we have been 
involved and have been able to won numerous Chinese antidumping cases, including initial investigations and 
review investigations, at both the Commerce Department for low dumping margins and at the US International 
Trade Commission (ITC) for no injury.  Many of these cases involved Chinese chemical or metal products, such as 
refined antimony trioxide, sulfur dyes, silicon carbide, saccharin, sulfanilic acid, and polyvinyl alcohol (PVA), 
including farm products such as garlic. Although the U.S. importers participated in the garlic case, we could not 
persuade the Chinese exporters. US importers told blank by he Chinese exporters, The U.S. market is not important 
for us. Since the Chinese exporters refused to participate at the DOC, the DOC had no choice and gave them the 
entire 376 percent antidumping margin alleged by the U.S. industry in the petition. The effect of the garlic 
determination was a complete disaster as all Chinese garlic has been shut out of the U.S. market since 1994. 
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After garlic case, the same law firm brought the dumping cases against Chinese honey, bicycle, 
mushrooms, silicomanganese, crawfish, iron castings, carbon steel plate, and brake rotors. On August 20, 2002, U.S. 
Department of Commerce made a final determination the pure magnesium in granular form produced in Canada or 
any other third country from pure magnesium ingots produced in China is within the scope of November 19, 2001, 
antidumping order on pure granular magnesium from China. 
 
10.  How to Solve Antidumping Charges against Chinese Companies 
 
 There are a number of strategies that Chinese exporters and producers can use in the initial investigation to 
increase their chances of winning the case. Chinese exporters should follow to win an antidumping case is to work 
with the importers. In many cases, Chinese exporters have decided to go it alone, and the result has been disaster. 
Although the Chinese exporters may have control over their own data, they do not understand the situation in the 
U.S. market. At the ITC, the importers are the only parties that can effectively argue against the U.S. industry.  
Moreover, importers can persuade the end user, which is an U.S. producer, to testify on behalf of the Chinese at ITC 
and the DOC.  Another very important reason for working with the importers is—politics. U.S. producers that use 
Chinese raw materials can bring substantial political pressure to bear on the DOC and the ITC because U.S. jobs 
may be dependent on the imported raw materials from China. Because importers are such an important factor in 
winning an antidumping case, Chinese exporters should not try to cut them out of the case and go it alone. 
 
11.  U.S. Antidumping Law Hurts Americans: Pros and Cons 
 
 Despite evidence of significant welfare costs and misguided economics of antidumping, the law continues 
to enjoy widespread support among policy members. Even members of Congress who represent export intensive 
states have little or no important competing constituents. Why is that? It has something to do with the fact that 
efforts to dissuade this type of protectionism have been less rigorous than efforts to encourage it. The benefits of 
protection accrue to a small group of concentrated producers while the costs are spread among a larger cross section 
of import users and consumers, so inherently there is a greater motivation to seek protection than to challenge it. It 
is, therefore, incumbent upon adversely affected constituencies to recognize that their consolidated stakes are higher 
than those of the protection-seekers. Policy makers in the antidumping arena have given the interests of importers, 
import-using industries, and consumers short shrift. Defenders of the antidumping law like to argue that 
antidumping is a trade lubricant.  By maintaining an antidumping law, constituencies that face the greatest 
challenges from open trade are more apt to buy into trade liberalization, generally. Antidumping laws have long 
been abused by protectionist U.S. industries seeking a reprieve from foreign competition.  However, in recent years, 
the tales have begun to turn and U.S. exporters are increasingly under target from foreign governments flexing their 
own antidumping muscle. Despite this trends, an alarming number of U.S. policy-makers have declared antidumping 
sacred cow, off limits to revision and discussion in any future trade agreements. This position risks stalling future 
trade talks because other countries may balk at opening their markets if we refuse to reform our own trade barriers. 
Furthermore, U.S. antidumping supporters ignore the new reality: antidumping laws are proliferating rapidly 
worldwide, closing or limiting markets to U.S. exporters at a growing clip, threatening to reverse gains achieved 
through years of market access liberalization. While American politicians lecture the world on fair trade, our 
dumping laws are an inquisitorial nightmare for foreign companies, making mockery of due process and justice at 
every turn.  The crime of dumping most often occurs as the result of the American government’s bureaucratic 
manipulation of numbers rather than actual foreign business practices. 
 
12.  Conclusion 
 
 The likelihood of continued antidumping proliferation a significant threat to U.S. export growth. As the 
world’s largest exporter, the U.S. should expect to be targeted even more as new countries learn how to wield the 
antidumping hatchet.  Traditional trade barriers are still high in developing countries, which will find great comfort 
in the availability of a WTO-sanctioned tool to replace those barriers.  It is difficult to imagine how China, 
heretofore relatively restrained in its antidumping actions, will be able to resist pleas from its import-competing 
industries for antidumping assistance, particularly since it has endured the most antidumping abuse. The 
antidumping law, and the related countervailing duty law, provides an important internationally recognized remedy 
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against foreign unfair trade practices.  These laws are essential to ensuring that international economic competition 
is based on free market principles, and that U.S. government intervention and tolerance of private anti-competitive 
practices are not allowed to distort market forces. Rather than being attacked, these laws should strengthened. 
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